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ARGUMENT 
THE COSTS TO DEFEND THE CLOUD NINE DEFENDANTS 
SHOULD BE APPORTIONED EQUALLY BETWEEN 
OHIO CASUALTY AND UNIGARD BASED ON APPLICATION 
OF THE OTHER INSURANCE PROVISION AND GENERAL 
PRINCIPALS OF THE DUTY TO DEFEND. 
As shown by the sheer number of cases addressing the subject matter and the 
differing results, the apportionment of defense and/or indemnification costs between 
liability insurers and/or insureds is not an easy or exact formulaic endeavor. Rather, 
apportionment of insurance coverage is a complex issue in which courts consider many 
factors in determining the end result: 1) the type of underlying incident and claimed 
losses involved in the case; 2) the type of coverage triggered (e.g. Coverage A bodily 
injury/property damage or Coverage B personal and advertising injury); 3) the type of the 
coverage being apportioned (e.g. defense versus indemnification); 4) the insurance 
contract language; 5) the general duties and rights of insurer and insured; and 6) overall 
principles of equity and public policy (and this is unlikely an exhaustive list of the 
factors). Courts, including this Court, appear to recognize that there is not one type of 
formula or method of apportionment which works for all cases, but rather certain 
methods may work best in certain cases, depending upon the factual circumstances of the 
case. See Sharon Steel Corp, v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127, fn.22 (Utah 
1997) ("We recognize that the principles set forth in this opinion may not lend 
themselves to simple and straightforward application to the factual circumstances of this 
case. We therefore grant considerable discretion to the trial court in devising a formula 
which best reflects our decision."); see also Wooddale Builders, Inc. v. Maryland Cas. 
Co., 722 N.E.2d 283, 301 (Minn. 2006) (addressing apportionment of indemnification 
costs, the court stated: "our holdings here must be viewed through the lens of the facts 
presented to us . . . and we emphasize that district courts must be flexible, as we have 
been here, in responding to different fact situations."). 
In the present case, Judge Tena Campbell of the United States District Court for 
the District of Utah considered many of the foregoing factors in determining how to 
apportion the costs of defense as between the parties in this case, insurers, The Ohio 
Casualty Insurance Company ("Ohio Casualty") and Unigard Insurance Company 
("Unigard"), and the insureds, Cloud Nine, LLC, and Easy Seat, LLC, and their members 
are Defendants and Counter Claimants Rodney Ford, Blaine Ford and Rex Haddock 
(collectively referred to as the "Cloud Nine Defendants"). The district court correctly 
determined, "based on the plain language of the insurance policies and Utah law 
regarding the scope of an insurer's duty to defend," that the defense costs should be 
shared by Ohio Casualty and Unigard on an equal basis. (APLT APP, v. 13, at 2078); see 
also Addendum to Unigard's Opening Brief (Exhibit "A")). In making that ruling, the 
district court also correctly rejected Ohio Casualty's proffered allocation of defense costs 
as between both the insurers and insureds based on months of time on the risk as being 
contrary to Utah law requiring an insurer to defend covered and non-covered claims in 
the same lawsuit until the insurer can limit the suit to claims outside the policy. See id. 
citing Benjamin v. Arnica Mut Ins. Co., 2006 UT 37, % 25, 140 P.3d 1210 ("[I]f an 
insurer has a duty to defend one count of a complaint, it must defend them all."). In 
answering the question certified to it by the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth 
Circuit, Unigard respectfully request this Court to find that the district court was correct 
in finding that the defense costs should be shared by Ohio Casualty and Unigard on an 
equal basis based on the "equal shares'' method set forth in the Other Insurance 
Provisions. Such ruling is also supported by Utah law regarding rights and obligations 
among insurers and insureds and principles of equity. 
A. The Other Insurance Provision Applies To And Provides For The Method Of 
Equal Sharing Of Defense Costs As Between Ohio Casualty and Unigard. 
1. The Language Of The Other Insurance Provision Does Not Temporally 
Limited Its Application Solely To Circumstances In Which The 
Insurance Policies Have Concurrent/Overlapping Policy Periods. 
In its Opening Brief, Ohio Casualty argues that the Other Insurance Provisions 
contained in its and Unigard's Insurance Policies apply in circumstances where the 
insurance policies "provide concurrent liability coverage for the same loss." Ohio 
Casualty's Opening Brief at 14. In making that argument, Ohio Casualty recognizes that 
the term "loss" has a broad interpretation, but then claims that it is limited to 
circumstances where the insurance policies have overlapping policy periods by the phrase 
"we cover" immediately following the term "loss". As demonstrated in Unigard's 
Opening Brief, the usually and accepted meaning of the full phrase of "loss ["damage . . . 
injury"] we cover [wwto protect by means of insurance"]" is a broad, general phrase, 
encompassing and applying to both circumstances of concurrent/overlapping insurance 
coverage and successive/consecutive insurance coverage. See Unigard's Opening Brief 
at 27-28, quoting Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Ed. 1990) at 365 and 945. The Other 
Insurance Provision does not contain any language which temporally restricts or limits its 
application to those losses or injuries occurring solely during the policy period, a 
situation which Ohio Casualty and other courts and scholars define as "concurrent 
coverage". Neither the phrase "policy period" nor the term "concurrent" is used in the 
Other Insurance Provision. Nor is there any language or reference that the "loss" has to 
only involve the exact same "loss" falling only within the insurers' policy period, and 
cannot involve a "loss" which covers the span of more than one policy period. Ohio 
Casualty narrowly construes the Other Insurance Provisions found in this case when the 
language does not support such construction. 
Insurers certainly know of and understand that they insure a number of risks that 
involve losses caused by occurrences or offenses which are of a continuous or 
progressive nature (exposure to toxic substances, environmental contamination, soil 
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settlement, trade dress, unfair competition occurring within advertisements via broadcast 
and websites) and such losses can span and trigger successive policy periods. Those 
types of loss fall within the language of "a loss we cover" for the successive policies 
involved in this case. Furthermore, those losses and the occurrence and/or offenses 
which span successive policies are generally of a type or nature which cannot be easily 
differentiated or divisible based on policy periods, especially at the stage in which 
defense duties arise. With that knowledge, the insurers in this case each used language in 
the Other Insurance Provisions of a broad nature which cover such situations of 
successive other insurance and provide an equitable way to share in defense costs equally 
between the insurers, which comports with the principle that an insurer owes a duty to 
defend all claims alleged in a suit whether all of the claims fall in or outside coverage 
under the policy. See Benjamin, 2006 UT 37, at ^ 25, 140 P.3d 1210 ("[I]f an insurer has 
a duty to defend one count of a complaint, it must defend them all."). 
Unigard has agreed to honor the foregoing contractual obligation it made to the 
Cloud Nine Defendants within the Other Insurance Provision, as well as its other 
expressed contractual obligation to defend the insureds for the entire suit. See APLT 
APP v. 5 at 917 (w'We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to 
pay as damages because of 'personal and advertising injury' to which this insurance 
applies. We will have a right and duty to defend the insured against any 'suit' seeking 
those damages."). Ohio Casualty, on the other hand, is unwilling to honor its identical 
contractual obligations to the Cloud Nine Defendants, claiming that the insureds owe a 
greater share of the defense costs than it does. Such resulting allocation of defense costs 
is neither provided for in the language of the Insurance Policies issued to the Cloud Nine 
Defendants nor is supported by Utah insurance law or principles of equity. 
2. The Caselaw and Authorities Espousing The View That Other 
Insurance Provisions Only Apply To Concurrent And/Or Overlapping 
Insurance Are Not Relevant When One Considers The Language Of 
The Other Insurance Provisions Found In This Case. 
In its Opening Brief, Ohio Casualty continues to rely upon caselaw and treatises 
which espouse the view that Other Insurance Provisions apply only to concurrent 
policies, but do not apply to successive policies ''because they do not insure the same risk 
and would unjustly make consecutive insurers liable for damages occurring outside their 
policy periods." See Ohio Casualty's Opening Brief at 16-22 and quoting E.M. Holmes, 
Appleman on Insurance § 145.4[C], at 34 (2d.ed 2003). In addition to citing to cases it 
previously cited to in its briefing before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Ohio 
Casualty explains and relies upon a recent decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
in Boston Gas v. Century Indemnity Co., 910 N.E.2d 290,454 Mass. 337 (2009). While 
the Boston Gas case is one additional case in which a court has found that the Other 
Insurance provisions are not applicable to case involving the question of allocation of 
6 
insurance among successive insurance policies, that case is very different and factually 
distinguishable from the case before this Court. 
First, the Boston Gas case involved a number of different first-layer excess 
policies which span several policies covering the time frame of 1951-1969. For that time 
frame, the parties were not able to provide to the jury or court the policy language, and 
specifically the Other Insurance provision, for the policies covering the period of 1951 to 
1960. The policies for the periods from 1961-1969 contained provisions addressing 
Other Insurance, but such provisions are different from the Other Insurance Provisions at 
issue in this case. The Other Insurance provisions contained no method of sharing, but 
only contained an excess escape clause. Under those circumstances, it is not hard to 
understand that the Boston Gas Court found that such provisions' language was not 
helpful and "do not reflect an intention to cover losses from damage outside the policy 
period." Boston Gas, 910 N.E.2d at 308. The court found that the provisions simply 
reflect "a recognition of the many situations in which concurrent, not successive, 
coverage would exist for the same loss." Id. As demonstrated above and in Unigard's 
Opening Brief, the language of Other Insurance Provisions found in this case show an 
intent on the part of the insurers to apply the provisions' method of sharing to situations 
of allocation of defense costs involving primary concurrent or successive other insurance. 
Second, the Boston Gas case involved the question of apportionment of 
indemnification costs rather than apportionment of defense costs, as is the case at hand. 
That difference is very important because an insurer's obligations and duties with respect 
to indemnification are clearly limited by the insurance contract to only those damages 
caused by occurrences or offenses committed during the policy period. However, an 
insurer's obligations and duties with respect to defending the insured under the policy are 
not tied to or limited by the policy period, nor does the law make such limitation. Rather, 
an insurer under the contract and law is obligated to defend the "suit" rather than just the 
claims falling within the policy period. Accordingly, again it is understandable that the 
Boston Gas Court made the determination that the Other Insurance provisions only 
applied to circumstances of concurrent coverage and "do not reflect an intention to cover 
losses from damage outside the policy period." Id. 
In the context of allocating defense costs, however, the underlying premise for 
restricting the application of Other Insurance Provisions to only concurrent insurers 
(unjustly making consecutive insurers liable for damages occurring outside their policies 
periods) does not make sense or have relevance because the insurers' defense duties 
already go beyond the bounds of only indemnifying strictly covered claims. The duty to 
defend under the contract terms and under general principles of insurance law is broader 
than the duty to indemnify. See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 
931 P.2d 127, 133 (Utah 1997). 
Upon considering the Other Insurance and other contractual provisions of the first-
layer excess policies, the Boston Gas Court examined the insurance policies' language in 
total within the context of providing indemnification for damages occurring during long 
periods of time that occurred before and after the subject insurance policies: 
Further, we doubt that an objectively reasonable insured 
reading the relevant policy language would expect coverage 
for liability from property damage occurring outside the 
policy period. Read as a whole, neither Century policy 
expressly makes or implies a promise to pay one hundred per 
cent of Boston Gas's liability for multi-year pollution damage 
occurring decades before or after the policy period. No 
reasonable policyholder could have expected that a single 
one-year policy would cover all losses caused by toxic 
industrial wastes released into the environment over a course 
of several decades. Any reasonable insured purchasing a 
series of occurrence-based policies would have understood 
that each policy covered it only for property damage 
occurring the policy period. 
Id. at 309. The facts of this case regarding the language found within the Ohio Casualty 
and Unigard Policies, the defense obligations of the insurers and the facts of the 
underlying Edizone Suit, show an opposite result, that an objectively reasonable insured 
reading the relevant policy language would expect that each insurer owes it a duty to 
defend the entire suit whether or not all of the claims fall within the policy period and 
that defense coverage should shared equally among the insurers. 
3, The Keenan Case 
Just as Ohio Casualty has found an additional case in the Boston Gas decision, 
which adopts the notion that Other Insurance Provisions only apply to concurrent insurers 
and not successive insurers, there is an additional case since briefing before the Tenth 
Circuit, in which the court rejected that notion. See Keenan Hopkins Schmidt and Stowell 
Contractors, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 2009 WL 2868627 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2009), a 
copy of which is appended hereto as Addendum, Exhibit "A". The Keenan case involved 
claims made by an insured subcontractor for recovery of costs defending and settling a 
general contractors third-party claim brought in a faulty-construction suit. The claims of 
faulty construction spanned several years and triggered successive cgl insurance policies 
provided by insurers Zurich (1995-1997), Travelers Indemnity and Aetna Casualty 
(1997-2000) and Continental Casualty (2000-2003). Id. at *3. Keenan requested the 
court to order Continental to contribute its pro-rata share as between itself and the other 
insurers. Id. at * 1. 
The Continental insurance policy contained an Other Insurance endorsement with 
which contained language similar to the Provision involved in the case at hand, but the 
Continental endorsement also contained an excess escape clause. Id. at *7. Continental 
claimed that based on the language of the Other Insurance Endorsement it was only 
obligated to provide excess coverage over other primary coverage available. In arguing 
against Continental's claim of excess coverage, the policyholder, Keenan, asserted that 
Continental's Other Insurance provision was not applicable because the policies were not 
concurrent. To that argument, Judge Thomas A. Wiseman of the District Court of 
Florida stated: 
Keenan further argues that because Continental's 
endorsement 'only deals with losses covered under its policy 
period, and because there are no other concurrent primary 
policies, the endorsement is inapplicable to the subject loss. 
(Doc. No. 124 at 4.) This argument is unavailing. The 
endorsement at issue does not concern the policy periods 
covered by other insurance and is not dependent upon 
whether the policies are "concurrent." Rather, by its terms 
the Continental Policy states that "if other valid and 
collectible insurance is available to the insured for a loss we 
cover . . . , this insurance is excess over any other of the other 
insurance . . . . " (Continental Policy at 24). There is no 
dispute here that Keenan had "other valid and collectible" 
"available" to it, of which in fact it availed itself. The fact 
that the policy periods themselves are not overlapping is 
therefore of no moment. 
Id. at *9 (emphasis added). Judge Wiseman then ruled that based on the language of the 
Other Insurance provision, Continental was only obligated to provide excess insurance 
coverage. Id. 
Unlike the Boston Gas case, the Keenan case involves an Other Insurance 
Provision which includes the very language most at issue in this case with respect to 
Other Insurance. The Keenan Court considered such language and correctly found that 
its application was not "dependent upon whether the policies are concurrent." Id. 
Unigard respectfully requests this Court to follow the reasonable analysis of the Keenan 
Court1 in answering the question certified to it finding that the language of the Other 
Insurance Provision in this case does not limit its application solely to circumstances of 
concurrent insurance. 
4. The Language Of The Other Insurance Provision Includes The 
Insurers' Intent To Share In The Duty To Defend As Between 
Successive Insurers, 
Lastly, Unigard recognizes the rationale of the notion that liability insurers do not 
intend to provide insurance coverage for damages occurring outside the policy period. 
Indeed, Unigard being an insurer, agrees with that general notion. The risk of providing 
payment for damages caused by occurrences and offenses being committed outside of the 
policy period is a risk to be borne by the insured, if it chooses to be uninsured, or is a risk 
to be borne by another insurer in exchange for the insured's premium payment. 
However, in addition to the obligation of indemnification, liability insurers 
contractually agree to provide the obligation of defending an insured when a suit is filed 
which alleges and seeks damages caused by an occurrence or offense committed during 
the policy period. Liability insurers know that within such a suit the plaintiff may claim 
conduct and/or damages which are not covered by the liability policy and/or claim that 
the damages are caused by occurrences or offenses falling outside of the policy period. 
Judge Wiseman's name, alone, is quite compelling. 
1 0 
Under their contractual duties, as reflected by the insurance policy and general principles 
of insurance law, the insurer is obligated to defend all of the claims, covered and non-
covered, as alleged by the plaintiff. In some of these circumstances, where plaintiffs 
claims span policy periods two or more insurers providing consecutive policies, each 
insurer owes the duty to defend the insured, and in essence, they become concurrent 
insurers with respect to the duty to defend. The language of the Other Insurance 
Provision includes and covers that defense obligation. The Other Insurance Provision 
specifically provides: "If this insurance is primary, our obligations are not affected 
unless any of the other insurance is also primary. Then, we will share with all that other 
insurance by the method described in c below [which provides for contribution of equal 
shares]." (APLT APP, v. 2, at 342-343 [Ohio Casualty Policy] and v. 5, at 924-925 
2
 Indeed, a Texas Court of Appeals has acknowledged the circumstance that consecutive 
insurers can be considered or deemed concurrent insurers: 
It is true that the coverage of the Alliance and ECC policies are consecutive 
and do not overlap. However, it does not follow that there cannot be 
concurrent coverage from consecutive policies. Black's Law Dictionaiy 
defines "concurrent insurance" as "insurance under two or more similar 
policies ofvarying dates and amounts" Black's Law Dictionary 803 (6r 
ed. 1990) (emphasis added). Numerous claims based on events occurring 
over long periods of time-such as the underlying silicosis claims in this 
case-may simultaneously trigger coverage from two or more policies even 
though there is no overlap in the policy dates. 
Texas Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Assoc/Southwest Aggregates v. Southwest Aggregates, 
Inc., 982 S. W.2d 600, 607 (Texas Ct App. 1998). 
[Unigard Policy]) (emphasis added). The use of the term "obligations" denotes and 
includes both the obligation to indemnify and defend, and as demonstrated previously, 
the broad language of the Other Insurance Provision's first paragraph provides for its 
application to all circumstances of other available insurance. 
Accordingly, while the notion that liability insurers do not intend to provide 
insurance coverage for damages occurring outside the policy period is sound, that notion 
does not justify a limitation of the Other Insurance Provisions found in this case. The 
Other Insurance Provision found in this case contains broad language which clearly 
encompasses defense obligations and clearly applies to other insurance situations 
involving policies which provide concurrent defense coverage for the claims alleged in 
the suit, but do not have overlapping policy periods. This Court, therefore, should answer 
the certified question finding that the defense costs should be allocated between Ohio 
Casualty and Unigard under the equal shares method provided by the Other Insurance 
Provisions contained in the Insurance Policies issued by Ohio Casualty and Unigard. 
B. Ohio Casualty's Espoused Method Of Time On The Risk Does Not Comport 
With The Principles Of Equitable Apportionment As Set Forth In the Sharon 
Steel Case Or The General Principles Of An Insurer's Duty To Defend. 
Even if the Court answers the certified question such that it rejects the position 
that the Other Insurance Provision decrees the method of apportionment in this case, it 
can and should apply and analyze wCequitable principles" to answer the question of 
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allocation of defense costs in this case as provided for in the decision of Sharon Steel 
Corp. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127, 140 (Utah 1997). In conducting 
that analysis, the Court should find that the district court was correct in rejecting Ohio 
Casualty's espoused method of time-on-the-risk method of apportionment of defense 
costs which is based on months on the risk and apportions defense costs to the Cloud 
Nine Defendants. A method of months of time-on-the-risk does not, as provided for in 
Sharon Steel, reflect what the insurers contracted to provide the insureds. Id. The 
insurance coverage is not limited to the time in which the occurrence or offense was 
committed, as espoused by Ohio Casualty, but covers both defense and indemnification 
obligations based on the paid premium. If you apply the logic of Ohio Casualty's month-
on-the-risk method of sharing to an occurrence/offense occurring on a single day, then 
Ohio Casualty would only owe defense coverage of 1/365th ratio. That method of time-
on-the-risk is clearly not equitable and does not reflect what each insurer contracted to 
provide coverage to the insured. 
Furthermore, Ohio Casualty's claim that the Cloud Nine Defendants should be 
apportioned with 6/45ths of the defense costs does not comport with equitable principles 
of apportionment as provided in the Sharon Steel case. Ohio Casualty's claim also 
contravenes the general principle declared by this Court in the case of Benjamin v. Arnica 
Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 UT 37, 140 P.3d 1210 that insurers are "obligated to provide a 
1 C 
defense to the entire suit" even in cases when both covered and non-covered claims are 
alleged in the suit. Id. at ^ [25. 
In its Opening Brief, Ohio Casualty essentially claims that the principles set forth 
in Benjamin have no relevance or effect on the issue of apportionment of defense costs, 
and that for all circumstances the formula set forth in Sharon Steel, including apportion 
of defense costs to insureds for any period of time in which it is uninsured, applies to all 
cases, no matter the differing facts involved in a case. Such claim is flawed because it 
fails to recognize the overarching principle that apportionment of insurance coverage as 
between and among insurers and/or insureds is not an exacting formulaic science, but 
involves principles of equity (e.g. equitable subrogation) and concerns an examination of 
both facts and underlying insurance law to reach the best solution. In that examination, 
the statements made by this Court in the Benjamin decision are, indeed, relevant to this 
case to determine the apportionment defense costs as between Ohio Casualty, Unigard 
and the Cloud Nine Defendants. 
In making its argument for apportionment of defense costs to the Cloud Nine 
Defendants, Ohio Casualty asserts that the Cloud Nine Defendants did not join in 
Unigard's argument related to the allocation of defense costs and did not oppose Ohio 
Casualty's allocation arguments. Accordingly, Ohio Casualty claims that any objection 
which the Cloud Nine Defendant have to allocation of defense is waived. See Ohio 
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Casualty's Opening Brief at fn.2 and p. 27. Ohio Casualty is mistaken. Within their 
Memorandum in Response and Joining Unigard Insurance Company's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, the Cloud Nine Defendants specifically and expressly stated that 
they "agree with, join and incorporate by reference herein Unigard's Statement of 
Undisputed Material Facts and Points I and II of the Argument in its Memorandum in 
Support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment." (APLT APP, v. 5, at 1039). Point 
II of Unigard's Memorandum is entitled "THE DEFENSE OBLIGATION TO THE 
CLOUD NINE DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE SHARED EQUALLY BETWEEN OHIO 
CASUALTY AND UNIGARD" and it contains the specific argument that the insurers 
contractually commit to equal sharing under the other insurance provisions contained in 
the policies issued to the Cloud Nine Defendants. (APLT APP, v. 4, at 687-689). 
Accordingly, the Cloud Nine Defendants have asserted their position that the defense 
obligation owed to them should be shared equally between Ohio Casualty and Unigard 
and therefore oppose Ohio Casualty's claim that they are obligated to pay a portion of the 
defense costs based on a months on the risk formula. 
Lastly, even if the Court rejects the specific finding that the Other Insurance 
Provisions governs the method of apportionment of defense costs, Unigard respectfully 
urges the Court to consider that it can and should find that district court's ruling of equal 
apportionment of defense costs as between Ohio Casualty and Unigard is sound and 
comports with equitable principles of apportionment as applied to the facts of this case. 
While it is not a time-on-the risk method of apportioning defense costs as set forth in the 
Sharon Steel case, the district court's equal share of apportionment takes into account the 
facts involved in this specific case (e.g. advertising injury claims of a indivisible nature, 
expressed contractual obligations to defend the suit, not just claims falling within the 
policy period, equal duties to defend among the insurers, and the equal share method set 
forth in both insurance contracts) and bests fashions an equitable apportionment of 
defense costs among the insurers. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and set forth in its Opening Brief, Appellee, 
Unigard Insurance Company, respectfully requests that this Court to answer the certified 
question, finding that the defense costs incurred in defending the Cloud Nine Defendants 
in the Edizone Suit should be allocated between Ohio Casualty and Unigard under the 
"equal shares" method based on the Other Insurance provisions contained in the Ohio 
Casualty and Unigard Policies and based on general principles of insurance lawr and 
equity as stated by this Court in its Sharon Steel and Benjamin decisions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6 day of December 2009. 
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H 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, M.D. Florida, 
Fort Myers Division. 
KEENAN HOPKINS SCHMIDT AND STOWELL 
CONTRACTORS, INC., a Florida corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, De-
fendant. 
No. 2:07-cv-383-FtM-34DNF. 
Sept. 1,2009. 
Background: Insured subcontractor brought state-
court action against commercial general liability 
(CGL) insurer, seeking to recover costs of defend-
ing against and settling general contractor's third-
party claim against insured in faulty-construction 
lawsuit. Insurer removed action on diversity 
grounds, and moved for summary judgment. 
Holdings: The District Court, Thomas A. Wiseman 
Jr., Senior District Judge sitting by designation, 
held that: 
(1) insurer was not prejudiced by insured's late no-
tice of claim and could not rely on late notice to 
support coverage denial; 
(2) CGL policy was excess to other insurance 
policies; 
(3) insurer had no duty to defend, given clear super-
seding endorsement to that effect contained in CGL 
policy; 
(4) reduced-deductible endorsement that went into 
effect after date when suit was filed against general 
contractor did not apply; and 
(5) CGL policy's known-loss exclusion was applic-
able. 
Motion granted. 
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on late notice to support denial of coverage, given 
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[81 Insurance 217 €=^2285(2) 
217 Insurance 
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(CGL) insurer had no duty to defend insured, even 
though coverage portion of policy referenced duty 
to defend, given superseding endorsement which 
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217 Insurance 
217XXIII Duty to Defend 
217k2911 k. In General; Nature and Source 
of Duty. Most Cited Cases 
Under Florida law, in absence of express statutory 
or contractual duty to defend, there is no such duty. 
[11] Insurance 217 € ^ 2 2 6 5 
217 Insurance 
217XVII Coverage—Liability Insurance 
217XVII(A) In General 
217k2263 Commencement and Duration 
of Coverage 
217k2265 k. Continuous Acts and In-
juries; Trigger. Most Cited Cases 
Insurance 217 €^>2282 
217 Insurance 
217XVII Coverage-Liability Insurance 
217XVII(A) In General 
217k2279 Amounts Payable 
217k2282 k. Deductibles. Most Cited 
Cases 
Under Florida law, damage to property resulting 
from insured subcontractor's faulty workmanship 
"manifested" at least by date that property owner 
sued general contractor for that damage, within 
commercial general liability (CGL) insurance 
policy's "known and continuing loss" endorsement's 
definition of "manifested," i.e. "when the damage is 
first discovered by the person or organization who 
suffered such damage," and therefore reduced-
deductible endorsement that went into effect after 
that date did not apply. 
[12] Insurance 217 €=>2265 
217 Insurance 
217XVII Coverage—Liability Insurance 
217XVII(A) In General 
217k2263 Commencement and Duration 
of Coverage 
217k2265 k. Continuous Acts and In-
juries; Trigger. Most Cited Cases 
Under Florida law, property damage resulting from 
insured subcontractor's faulty workmanship 
"manifested," within meaning of commercial gener-
al liability (CGL) insurance policy's known and 
continuing loss exclusion applicable to damage 
"that is continuous or progressively deteriorating 
and which 'manifested' prior to the inception ... of 
the policy period," when property owner discovered 
damage; property owner did not have to attribute 
loss to insured or its sub-subcontractors, or even re-
cognize damage as "property damage" falling with-
in policy's definition, in order to trigger exclusion. 
Mark A. Boyle, Sr., Debbie Sines Crockett, Boyle 
& Gentile, PA, Ft. Myers, FL, for Plaintiff. 
Anthony A.B. Dogali, Jacqueline Taylor, Haley R. 
Maple, Lee William Atkinson, Forizs & Dogali, 
PL, Tampa, FL, for Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
THOMAS A. WISEMAN, JR., Senior District 
Judge Sitting by designation. 
*1 Before the Court is Defendant Continental Casu-
alty Company's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
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Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Doc. No. 89), 
to which the Plaintiff has filed its Response and 
Memorandum of Law in Opposition (Doc. No. 
113). At the Court's request, the Defendant also 
filed a reply brief (Doc. No. 124); Plaintiff, with 
permission, then filed a sur-reply (Doc. No. 132). 
The motion, having been amply briefed, is ripe for 
consideration. Pursuant to Local Rule 3.010), 
Plaintiff has requested oral argument on the motion 
(Doc. No. 114), but the Court finds that oral argu-
ment would not be of assistance in resolving the 
motion. That request is therefore denied. 
Further, for the reasons explained below, the Court 
finds that the Defendant has established that it is 
entitled to summary judgment. The pending motion 
will therefore be granted and this matter dismissed. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Plaintiff, Keenan Hopkins Schmidt and Stowell 
Contractors, Inc. ("Keenan"), filed suit in state 
court against the Defendant, Continental Casualty 
Company ("Continental"), for declaratory relief and 
for damages caused by Continental's alleged breach 
of its insurance contract with Keenan. This case 
arises out of an earlier suit ("Underlying Case") 
brought by Disney Vacation Development, Inc. 
("Disney") against McDevitt Street Bovis ("Bovis") 
for faulty construction of the Disney Boardwalk 
(hereinafter, the "Boardwalk" or "project site"). 
Bovis, believing that Keenan was responsible for 
some of the faulty construction that formed the 
basis of Disney's complaint, impleaded Keenan into 
the Underlying Case. In the present suit, Keenan 
claims that it tendered the defense and requested in-
demnification in the Underlying Case from its in-
surers, including Continental, but that Continental 
wrongfully refused to defend or to indemnify Keen-
an. Keenan now urges this Court to issue a judicial 
declaration that Continental failed to abide by the 
terms of the insurance contract in effect between 
Continental and Keenan, and further requests that 
this Court order Continental to contribute its pro-
rata share of the legal fees and settlement costs 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No 
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Keenan and its other insurers incurred in the Under-
lying Case. After removing the case to federal 
court, Continental filed the present motion for sum-
mary judgment. 
II. THE FACTUAL RECORD 
This action arises out of disputes regarding con-
struction defects and damages affecting Disney's 
Boardwalk. On August 15, 1994, Disney contracted 
with Bovis as the general contractor to build the 
Boardwalk. Bovis then subcontracted with Keenan, 
among other subcontractors. Schedule A to the sub-
contract between Keenan and Bovis lists a number 
of items that Keenan was obligated to "furnish and 
install," including but not limited to: 
All exterior architectural trim and surrounds .... 
All exterior architectural: GFRC, Polygarde wood-
work, plastic, FRP, trim.... 
All exterior wall and roof, metal and wood framing. 
Wood framing as it applies to plywood at metal 
framing and corrugated metal decks. 
*2 .... 
All soffits, eave, fascia, rakes, entablatures, cor-
nices, etc., architectural elements at the envel-
opes of the buildings and site structures.... 
(Doc. 91-4, Keenan-Bovis Subcontract, at 11.) 
On September 7, 1995, Lyle Painting, the painting 
subcontractor, contacted Bovis regarding paint fail-
ures and delays caused by defective "wood trim." 
(Doc. 91-6, 9/7/1995 Message from Lyle Painting.) 
Bovis identified Keenan as the party that had in-
stalled the defective "wood trim" and then advised 
Keenan that it was responsible for resolving the 
problem. (Doc. 91-7, 9/18/1995 Letter from Bovis 
to Keenan.) 
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On October 11, 1995, Disney sent a letter to Bovis 
regarding extensive water intrusion "through the 
roofs, exterior facades, expansion joints, unsealed 
and open slab penetrations, etc.," and stated that 
"[t]he source of these problems is directly tied to 
completion of the roofs and exterior facades." (Doc. 
91-9, 10/11/1995 Letter from Disney to Bovis.) 
This letter described the chaotic situation at the 
project site and attributed much of the delay in the 
completion of the roof and exterior facades to the 
lack of coordination between Bovis and its many 
sub-contractors, including Keenan. Disney attrib-
uted Bovis' inability to "complete the roofing and 
exterior facades for this project" to a widespread 
lack of "manpower" on the part of some of the sub-
contractors, including Keenan. (Id.) As a result of 
delays in completing roofing and exterior facades, 
"drywall, in-wall insulation, and wall finishes 
[we]re being affected by water intrusion." (Id.) 
Disney and Bovis executed a "Close-out Change 
Order" on August 30, 1997 (Doc. 91-23), pursuant 
to which Disney agreed to release various claims it 
had against Bovis, while specifically reserving its 
right to enforce the obligations contained in the 
Close-Out Change Order. Attachment H to the 
"Close-out Change Order" reserves in pertinent part: 
\. Paint Defects-Repair or replacement of exterior 
paint defects including: 
i) building decorative shutters; 
ii) balcony divider partitions and running trim; 
iii) exterior facade (e.g.*, blistering, peeling and 
premature fading). 
5. Roof Leaks-Repair and replacement of areas of 
roof where water penetration is occurring .... 
(Doc. 91-23, at 55.) Keenan was then directed to at-
tend a meeting with Bovis and Disney on October 
27, 1997 to resolve the issues caused by the defect-
ive "paint or the wood products" supplied by Keen-
an's sub-contract. (See 10/21/1997 Letter from 
Bovis to Keenan, Doc. 91-20 (giving notice of the 
meeting with Disney and advising Keenan to send a 
representative to the meeting).) A letter dated Octo-
ber 28, 1997 from Bovis to an attorney for Keenan 
documents that Keenan failed to attend the meeting. 
That letter documents Bovis' frustration with Keen-
an's refusal to deal with issues caused by its work: 
My greater concern is the failure of Keenan Hop-
kins Schmidt & Stowell to attend the meeting 
which we had requested they attend with the 
Owner yesterday to deal with outstanding war-
ranty items, particularly those contained in exhib-
it H of the close out change order. 
*3 (Doc. No. 91-21.) 
On June 9, 2000, Disney filed a complaint in Flor-
ida state court against Bovis, asserting claims for 
breach of contract based on deficient workmanship 
relating to the project. (Doc. No. 91-24, Disney 
Compl.) Bovis, in turn, tendered the defense to and 
demanded indemnification from Keenan on August 
29, 2002. (Doc. No. 91-25.) Keenan claims that, 
prior to this tender, it had no knowledge that Dis-
ney had sued Bovis. Despite the tender in 2002, 
Keenan also claims that it had "no information" 
that Bovis actually intended to seek damages from 
Keenan until November 9, 2004, when Bovis filed a 
Third-Party Complaint against Keenan in the Un-
derlying Case for contractual indemnity, common-
law indemnity, contribution, and breach of contract. 
(Doc. No. 91-22, Bovis 3d Party Compl.) Bovis 
specifically alleged that the work performed and/or 
the materials provided by Keenan "caused damages 
including but not limited to damages to tangible 
property other than the work performed under the 
subcontract from Bovis stemming from the alleged 
acts and/or omissions within the scope of the work 
of [Keenan]." (Doc. No. 113, at 4-5 (quoting Bovis 
Compl. against Keenan in Underlying Case) .) 
Bovis and Keenan settled in October 2007. 
At all times relevant to this dispute, Keenan pos-
sessed insurance coverage under the following 
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commercial general liability ("CGL") policies: (1) a 
policy issued by the Zurich family of insurers in ef-
fect from 1995 to 1997 (hereinafter, "Zurich 
Policy") (Doc. No. 112-7); (2) a policy issued by 
Travelers Indemnity Company and the Aetna Casu-
alty and Surety Company in effect from 1997 
through 2000 ("Travelers Policy") (Doc. No. 
112-9); and (3) a series of policies issued by De-
fendant Continental in effect from February 1, 2000 
until October 2003 ("the Policy" or "Continental 
Policy") (Doc. No. 91-3, 112-2, 112-3, 112-4, 
112-5, 112-6). Without actually addressing why, 
Keenan asserts that the Continental Policy in effect 
from February 1, 2000 through January 1, 2001 is 
the Policy that covers the loss for which Keenan 
now seeks reimbursement, and that is the policy 
term upon which the parties here have focused. As 
discussed below, the Continental Policy covers 
losses "discovered" by the injured party during the 
Policy period. The Court therefore assumes that 
Keenan focuses on the 2000 Policy because it is 
clear that Disney, the injured party, necessarily had 
knowledge of the property damage at issue no later 
than June 9, 2000, the day it tiled suit against Bovis. 
Each of the above-referenced policies insured 
Keenan for up to $2,000,000 for "General Aggreg-
ate Limit (Other than Products-Completed Opera-
tions)," up to $2,000,000 for "Products-Completed 
Operations Aggregate Limit," and $1,000,000 for 
"Each Occurrence Limit." (Continental Policy at 2; 
Zurich Policy at 2; Travelers Policy at 14.) 
Keenan placed all of its insurers on notice of Bovis' 
complaint on December 27, 2004. Continental re-
sponded on October 31, 2005 by issuing a letter to 
Keenan stating that it would not provide a defense 
or indemnity. (Doc. 91-33.) Keenan was ultimately 
defended in the Underlying Case by Zurich and 
Travelers, and these insurers collectively spent a 
large sum of money in defense fees and litigation 
costs in the Underlying Case. Keenan asserts that, 
in addition to the sums paid out by the insurers, it 
was required to pay approximately $292,480 out of 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No 
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its own pocket-$ 122,980 on attorney fees and de-
fense costs and $169,500 toward the settlement 
with Bovis. The record is unclear as to exactly why 
Keenan was required to pay that sum, given the 
coverage limitations of the Zurich and Travelers 
Policies. In any event, Keenan filed this action in 
state court against Continental on June 13, 2007 to 
recover the costs associated with the Underlying 
Case, including a pro-rata share of the expenditures 
made by Zurich and Travelers as well as the 
amounts paid by Keenan. Continental subsequently 
removed the case to federal court on the basis of di-
versity jurisdiction. 
*4 Continental has now filed its motion for sum-
mary judgment in which it relies primarily upon the 
express terms of the Policy itself in support of its 
denial of coverage in this case. Keenan, of course, 
opposes the motion. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All 
U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 
(1986). In resolving a motion for summary judg-
ment, the court must view all evidence and draw all 
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to 
the non-moving party. Patton v. Triad Guar. Ins. 
Corp., 277 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir.2002). 
However, "[t]he mere existence of some alleged 
factual dispute between the parties will not defeat 
an otherwise properly supported motion for sum-
mary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
411 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 
202 (1986). "Where the record taken as a whole 
could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 
nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for tri-
al' " and the court may grant the motion for sum-
mary judgment. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 
127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (quoting 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 
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538 (1986)). Conversely, if reasonable minds could 
disagree on the inferences arising from the material 
facts, then the court must deny the motion for sum-
mary judgment, and the case should proceed to dis-
covery. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 
The moving party bears the burden of demonstrat-
ing that the material facts underlying all the relev-
ant legal questions raised by the pleadings are not 
in dispute, or else summary judgment will be 
denied. Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm't, 193 F.3d 
1241, 1246 (11th Cir.1999); Brunswick Corp. v. 
Vineberg, 370 F.2d 605, 611-12 (5th Cir.1967). The 
nonmoving party is not required to present evidence 
when responding to a motion for summary judg-
ment unless and until the moving party itself has 
properly supported the summary judgment motion 
with sufficient evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & 
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 
142 (1970). Once the moving party meets this ini-
tial burden, then Rule 56(e) requires that the non-
moving party present opposing evidence; it may not 
"simply rely on the contrary allegation in [its] com-
plaint." Adickes, 398 U.S. at 160 (1970). If the non-
moving party introduces nothing more than a mere 
scintilla of evidence upon the basis of which a jury 
could not reasonably find for the nonmoving party, 
then the motion for summary judgment should be 
granted. Anderson, All U.S. at 252. Additionally, 
conclusory allegations and conjecture are not suffi-
cient to create a genuine issue of material fact and 
therefore cannot serve as the basis for denying sum-
mary judgment. Mayfield v. Patterson Pump Co., 
101F.3d 1371, 1376 (11th Cir. 1996). 
IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Continental raises a number of arguments in sup-
port of its assertion it is entitled to judgment in its 
favor as a matter of law, including: 
*5 (1) that because Keenan failed to provide timely 
notice of the claims made in the Underlying Case, 
its claims are now barred; 
(2) that the Continental Policy provided excess cov-
erage only and, because Keenan had primary cover-
age from other insurers and was actually defended 
and indemnified by its primary insurers, Continent-
al has no obligation to reimburse the other insurers 
for a pro-rate share of the expenditures made in de-
fending and settling the Underlying Case; 
(3) that the Policy endorsements expressly relieved 
Continental of any duty to defend Keenan in the 
Underlying Suit; 
(4) that the applicable deductible amount is in ex-
cess of whatever remaining amount Keenan paid 
out of pocket; and 
(5) alternatively, that the exclusion pertaining to 
known and continuing damage completely bars re-
covery in this case and, even if the policy did not 
contain a "known loss" provision, Keenan's claims 
would be barred by the common-law doctrine of 
"known loss / loss in progress." 
As explained in greater detail below, the Court 
finds that Continental was not prejudiced by any 
late notice of Keenan's claim and therefore cannot 
rely on that defense. However, the Court does find 
that the Continental Policy, by its unambiguous 
terms, was intended to provide excess rather than 
primary insurance coverage. Consequently, Contin-
ental has no contractual obligation to reimburse 
either Zurich or Travelers for any funds they spent 
defending or indemnifying Keenan in the Underly-
ing Case. With respect to the approximately 
$292,480 Keenan spent "out of pocket," it remains 
unclear why Keenan was required to pay that sum 
and the extent to which any amount of it would 
properly be reimbursable by an excess insurer. Re-
gardless, Continental is entitled to judgment in its 
favor with respect to that amount too because: (1) 
the Continental Policy did not require Continental 
to defend Keenan in the Underlying Case, such that 
Continental has no liability for the $122,980 in at-
torney fees and defense costs incurred by Keenan; 
and (2) the remainder, approximately $169,500, is 
less than the applicable deductible amount of 
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$250,000. 
Having concluded that Continental is entitled to 
judgment in its favor on those grounds, the Court 
has no need to reach Continental's remaining argu-
ments. Notwithstanding, the Court also finds that 
Disney clearly had knowledge of the property dam-
age at issue no later than 1997, such that Keenan's 
claims as a whole are apparently barred by the 
"known and continuing loss" provision in the 
Policy. This finding provides an alternative basis 
for summary judgment in favor of Continental. 
A. Florida Law and the Interpretation of Insur-
ance Contracts Generally 
[1][2] Two countervailing impulses govern the 
Court's interpretation of the insurance policy at is-
sue. On one hand, Florida courts have long recog-
nized the validity and enforceability of insurance 
contracts as a matter of public policy, see France v. 
Liberty Mut Ins. Co., 380 So.2d 1155, 1156 (Fla.3d 
Dist.Ct.App.1980), pursuant to which insurance 
contracts, like other contracts generally, are to be 
"construed in accordance with the plain language 
[thereof] as bargained for by the parties." Westmo-
reland v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 704 So.2d 
176, 179 (Fla. 4th Dist.Ct.App.1997); see also U.S. 
Auto. Ass'n v. McCray, 348 So.2d 6, 8 (Fla.3d 
Dist.Ct.App.1977) (noting that an insurance policy 
"should be construed according to the entirety of its 
terms as set forth therein and as amplified by any 
endorsement thereto" (citing Fla. Stat. § 627.419 
(1)). On the other hand, "Florida law is equally 
well-settled that insuring or coverage clauses are 
construed in the broadest possible manner to affect 
the greatest extent of coverage." Westmoreland, 
704 So.2d at 179. As a result, "ambiguities are in-
terpreted liberally in favor of the insured and 
strictly against the insurer who prepared the 
policy." Id. But ambiguity only exists when con-
tractual terms are "subject to opposing reasonable 
interpretations." Blue Shield of Fla., Inc. v. Wood-
lief, 359 So.2d 883, 884 (Fla. 1st Dist.Ct.App.1978) 
. As both parties here recognize, the fact that a 
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policy endorsement contradicts a provision con-
tained in the body of the policy will not necessarily 
result in ambiguity, because, under Florida law, "to 
the extent an endorsement is inconsistent with the 
body of the policy, the endorsement controls." 
Steuart Petroleum Co. v. Certain Underwriters at 
Lloyd's London, 696 So.2d 376, 379 (Fla. 1st 
Dist.Ct.App.1997). 
*6 With these principles in mind, the Court now 
turns to the parties' arguments. 
B. Continental Was Not Prejudiced by Late No-
tice of Keenan's Claim. 
One of the arguments raised by Continental which 
would potentially be dispositive of the entire case is 
that Keenan's claims under the Policy are barred be-
cause Keenan did not provide timely notice to Con-
tinental of those claims, as required by the terms of 
the Policy itself. In opposition to that argument, 
Keenan contends that because Continental did not 
comply with certain Florida statutory requirements, 
it is precluded from asserting the defense. Keenan 
also argues that the late-notice defense fails be-
cause Continental was not prejudiced by the late 
notice. The Court agrees that Continental's notice 
argument is without merit. 
[3][4] Under Florida law, an insured's failure to 
comply with a mandatory contractual provision re-
quiring it to provide written notice to the insurer of 
a claim "as soon as practicable" may negate an in-
surer's coverage obligation, but only if the insurer is 
actually prejudiced by the late notice. Tiedtke v. 
Fid. & Cas. Co. of New York, 222 So.2d 206, 209 
(Fla. 1969). Further, an insurer is ordinarily pre-
sumed to be prejudiced if the insured provides late 
notice of a claim in violation of the provisions of 
the insurance agreement. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Ma-
rias, 475 So.2d 1216, 1218 (Fla. 1985). The insured, 
however, can rebut that presumption by introducing 
evidence tending to show that the insurer was in 
fact not prejudiced by the late notice of the claim. 
Id. Florida courts have uniformly held that where 
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an insured possesses enough information to permit 
it to deny the claim on other grounds (and it actu-
ally did deny the claim on other grounds), it waives 
its right to object to coverage on the basis that the 
insured failed to provide timely notice of the claim. 
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Beville, 825 So.2d 
999, 1004 (Fla. 4th Dist.Ct.App.2002); Wegener v. 
Int'l Bankers Ins. Co., 494 So.2d 259, 259 (Fla.3d 
Dist.Ct.App.1986); Hartford Accident & Indem. 
Co. v. Phelps, 294 So.2d 362, 365 (Fla. 1st 
Dist.Ct.App.1974). 
[5] In the present case, regardless of whether Con-
tinental was required to comply with the statutory 
guidelines for asserting a late-notice defense, FNI 
the record reflects that Continental denied cover-
age-some ten months after receiving notice of the 
claim-premised not upon the late notice or any res-
ulting detrimental effect on its ability to investigate 
the claim, but upon Continental's interpretation and 
application of the terms of the contract itself. As 
the Florida Court of Appeals has also concluded 
under similar circumstances, this Court "cannot 
conceive that [the defendant] would not have also 
denied liability on these same grounds had the no-
tice been timely." Phelps, 294 So.2d at 365. The 
fact that Continental was able to investigate the 
claim sufficiently to permit it to deny the claim on 
other grounds effectively rebuts any presumption of 
prejudice arising from the late notice. Con-
sequently, Continental has not established that it is 
entitled to summary judgment on that basis. 
C. The "Other Insurance" Endorsement 
*7 The next argument the Court will consider is 
Continental's contention that the "other insurance" 
endorsement in the Policy relieves it of any obliga-
tion to indemnify either Zurich or Travelers, whose 
policies provided primary coverage, thereby sub-
stantially reducing its liability in this case. In addi-
tion, Continental argues that the "other insurance" 
endorsement clearly provides that Continental shall 
have no duty to defend any suit or claim that anoth-
er insurer has a duty to defend. (Continental Policy 
at 24.) As discussed below, the Court agrees that 
the Zurich and Travelers Policies, by their clear 
terms, provide primary coverage, while the Contin-
ental Policy only provides excess "other insurance" 
coverage. Accordingly, the Court will grant partial 
summary judgment in favor of Continental on the 
issue of whether the Continental Policy provided 
excess rather than primary coverage, thereby sub-
stantially limiting Keenan's potential recovery in 
this case. 
[6][7] To determine whether a policy provides for 
primary or excess coverage, Florida law requires 
that courts measure the intent of the parties "solely 
by the language of the policies unless the language 
is ambiguous." Towne Realty, Inc. v. Safeco Ins. 
Co., 854 F.2d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir.1988). A policy 
may contain language indicating that it is intended 
to provide primary coverage unless other insurance 
exists that also provides primary coverage and in-
sures the same loss, in which case the first policy 
will only provide "excess" coverage after exhaus-
tion of the limits of the second policy. However, 
where two or more policies that apparently cover 
the same loss both contain excess "other insurance" 
provisions, the clauses are deemed "mutually re-
pugnant." American Cas. Co. v. Health Care In-
dent., Inc., 613 F.Supp.2d 1310, 1319 
(M.D.Fla.2009). In such situations, "each insurer is 
then liable for a pro-rata share of the settlement or 
judgment" in accordance with its policy limits. 
Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 
386 F.Supp.2d 1272, 1278 (S.D.Fla.2005). 
[8] The Continental Policy at issue here contains an 
unambiguous "other insurance" endorsement, as 
follows: 
THE PROVISIONS UNDER CONDITION 4. 
OTHER INSURANCE ARE DELETED IN 
TOTAL AND REPLACED BY THE FOLLOW-
ING: 
F OTHER VALID AND COLLECTIBLE INSUR-
ANCE IS AVAILABLE TO THE INSURED 
FOR A LOSS WE COVER UNDER COVER-
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AGES A OR B OF THIS COVERAGE PART, 
THIS INSURANCE IS EXCESS OVER ANY 
OF THE OTHER INSURANCE, WHETHER 
PRIMARY, EXCESS, CONTINGENT, OR ON 
ANY OTHER BASIS. 
•VHEN THIS INSURANCE IS EXCESS, WE 
WILL HAVE NO DUTY UNDER COVER-
AGE A OR B TO DEFEND ANY CLAIM OR 
"SUIT' THAT ANY OTHER INSURER HAS 
A DUTY TO DEFEND.... 
tfHEN THIS INSURANCE IS EXCESS OVER 
OTHER INSURANCE, WE WILL PAY 
ONLY OUR SHARE OF THE AMOUNT OF 
THE LOSS, IF ANY, THAT EXCEEDS THE 
SUM OF: 
[\) THE TOTAL AMOUNT THAT ALL SUCH 
OTHER INSURANCE WOULD PAY FOR THE 
LOSS IN THE ABSENCE OF THIS INSUR-
ANCE; AND 
[2) THE TOTAL OF ALL DEDUCTIBLE AND 
SELF-INSURED AMOUNTS UNDER ALL 
THAT OTHER INSURANCE. 
*8 (Continental Policy at 24.) 
In contrast, the Zurich Policy's "other insurance" 
provision states, in pertinent part: 
[f other valid and collectible insurance is available 
to the insured for a loss we cover under Cover-
ages A or B of this Coverage Part, our obliga-
tions are limited as follows: 
a. Primary Insurance 
rhis insurance is primary except when b. below ap-
plies. If this insurance is primary, our obliga-
tions are not affected unless any of the other in-
surance is also primary. Then we will share 
with all that other insurance by the method de-
scribed in c. below. 
b. Excess Insurance 
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rhis insurance is excess over any of the other insur-
ance, whether primary, excess, contingent or on 
any other basis: 
1. That is Fire, Extended Coverage, Builder's Risk, 
Installation Risk or similar coverage for "your 
work;" 
2. That is "Specific Perils" insurance for premises 
rented to you; or 
3. If the loss arises out of the maintenance or use of 
aircraft, "autos" or watercraft to the extent not 
subject to Exclusion g. of Coverage A (Section I). 
When this insurance is excess, we will have no duty 
under Coverage A or B to defend any claim or 
"suit" that any other insurer has a duty to defend .... 
(Zurich Policy at 18.) 
The Travelers Policy's "other insurance" provision 
is identical to the Zurich Policy's, except that it 
identifies slightly different situations where the 
policy will be considered excess, none of which is 
applicable here. (Travelers Policy at 33.) In addi-
tion, the Zurich and Travelers Policies' "other in-
surance" provisions are identical to the Continental 
Policy's unamended and inoperative "other insur-
ance" provision (superseded by the Endorsement), 
except that it too enumerated slightly different situ-
ations in which the policy would be considered ex-
cess. (Continental Policy at 55.) 
The Court finds that the "other insurance" provision 
in the Continental Policy unambiguously relieves 
Continental from any duty to indemnify Keenan for 
a covered loss until all primary insurance coverage 
is exhausted, or to defend it against a lawsuit when 
other insurers have a primary duty to defend. In 
contrast, the "other insurance" provisions in the 
Zurich and Travelers Policies recognize that these 
policies, respectively, provide primary coverage ex-
cept in a limited number of specific circumstances, 
none of which is applicable in this case. Con-
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sequently, the insurance policies at issue are not 
"mutually repugnant." Am. Cas. Co., 613 F.Supp.2d 
at 1319. With Zurich and Travelers providing 
primary coverage, the Continental Policy provides 
excess coverage only. Continentals' duty to defend 
and indemnify is therefore "consecutive to, rather 
than concurrent with," Zurich's and Travelers' du-
ties as primary insurers. Nat'l Union Fire, 214 F.3d 
at 1273. There is no dispute that the Zurich Policy 
and the Travelers Policy each provided coverage up 
to $2,000,000 for "property damage" claims, for a 
total of $4,000,000, and that Zurich and Travelers 
did in fact cover the subject loss and provide a de-
fense in the Underlying Case. The other insurers' 
payments in this case, including defense costs 
(approximately $1,215,251) and settlement costs 
(approximately $1,195,000) totaled approximately 
$2,410,251-less than Zurich's and Travelers' com-
bined policy limits. Because the primary insurers' 
coverage limits were apparently not exhausted, 
Continental has no legal duty to reimburse those in-
surers for the amounts they spent in defending and 
indemnifying Keenan in the Underlying Case. 
*9 Keenan attempts to avoid this result by arguing, 
based on Appleman on Insurance, that an "other in-
surance" clause in the Continental Policy will be ef-
fective only if the clause "refers to the existence of 
other insurers that insure the 'same risk, for the be-
nefit of the same [entityf, during the same period 
of time.' " (Doc. No. 124, at 4 (quoting 23-145 Ap-
pleman on Insurance § 145.4[C] ).) Keenan further 
argues that because Continental's endorsement 
"only deals with losses covered under its policy 
period, and because there are no other concurrent 
primary policies, the endorsement is inapplicable to 
the subject loss." (Doc. No. 124, at 4.) This argu-
ment is unavailing. The endorsement at issue does 
not concern the policy periods covered by the other 
insurance and is not dependent upon whether the 
policies are "concurrent." Rather, by its terms, the 
Continental Policy states that "if other valid and 
collectible insurance is available to the insured for 
a loss we cover ..., this insurance is excess over any 
other of the other insurance...." (Continental Policy 
at 24.) There is no dispute here that Keenan had 
"other valid and collectible insurance" "available" 
to it, of which in fact it availed itself. The fact that 
the policy periods themselves were not overlapping 
is therefore of no moment. 
In sum, Continental is entitled to judgment in its fa-
vor as a matter of law on the question of whether its 
Policy provided excess insurance based on the ex-
istence of other primary insurance available to 
Keenan. That determination, in and of itself, will 
have the effect of reducing Continental's potential 
liability to only that sum paid out of pocket by 
Keenan, which Continental apparently concedes for 
purposes of its motion to be $292,480. (Doc No. 
124 at 12.) Of that sum, however, it is not clear 
how much would actually be payable by Continent-
al even if no other bases existed for reducing its po-
tential liability, because the record before the Court 
does not reveal why Keenan was required to pay 
any amount out of pocket in the first place. If it was 
because of the other policies' deductibles, the ex-
clusionary language "other insurance" endorsement 
quoted above suggests that Continental is only re-
quired to pay the amount of the insured's loss that 
"exceeds the sum of ... the total of all deductible 
and self-insured amounts under ... other insurance." 
(Continental Policy at 24.) In addition. Continental 
would not be required to reimburse Keenan for 
damages arising from losses that were not covered 
by the terms of the Continental Policy, such as 
damages relating to Keenan's own defective work 
product, as opposed to other property damage 
caused by Keenan's work. As discussed below, 
however, these gaps in the factual record are imma-
terial, because Continental is entitled to judgment 
in its favor on other grounds as to the remaining sum. 
D. The "Duty to Defend" Endorsement 
Separate and apart from the "other insurance" en-
dorsement pursuant to which Continental has no 
duty to defend when the Continental Policy is ex-
cess over other collectible insurance, Continental 
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further argues that it had no duty to defend under 
the clear terms of the Policy and therefore no oblig-
ation to reimburse Keenan for any amounts it paid 
out toward attorneys' fees or litigation costs. The 
Court agrees that the policy language unequivocally 
rejects any such duty. 
*10 [9][10] Under Florida law, the duty to indemni-
fy is separate and distinct from the duty to defend. 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. RJT Enters., 692 So.2d 142, 144 
(Fla.1997). Thus, as the Florida Supreme Court has 
recognized, "in the absence of an express statutory 
or contractual duty to defend, there is no such 
duty." Id. In the present case, neither party has 
pointed this Court to any statutory provision that 
might have bearing on the issue. Further, while 
Keenan argues generally that the duty to defend is 
broader than the duty to indemnify, that fact is only 
relevant if the insurer actually has an obligation to 
defend. Although the coverage portion of the Policy 
references a duty to defend (Continental Policy at 
47), Continental relies upon a superseding endorse-
ment which states, in pertinent part: 
5. THOSE PROVISIONS IN THE POLICY 
WHICH IMPOSE A DUTY ... TO DEFEND 
ANY SUIT SEEKING DAMAGES COVERED 
UNDER THE POLICY AND OBLIGATE U.S. 
TO PAY 'SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS' 
FN2
 ARE HEREBY DELETED FROM THE 
POLICY. 
5. WE HAVE NO OBLIGATION TO PAY OR 
CONTRIBUTE TO ANY ALLOCATED LOSS 
ADJUSTMENT EXPENSES. RATHER, YOU 
WILL PAY ALL SUCH EXPENSES UNDER 
ALL CIRCUMSTANCES. 
FURTHER, ALLOCATED LOSS ADJUST-
MENT EXPENSES WILL NOT BE APPLIED 
TO THE OCCURRENCE OR AGGREGATE 
DEDUCTIBLE AMOUNT. 
ALLOCATION CLAIM EXPENSES SHALL 
INCLUDE BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO, ALL 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY AND COURT 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No 
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COSTS, FEES AND EXPENSES, FEES FOR 
SERVICES OF PROCESS, FEES TO ATTOR-
NEYS, ... FEES OR COST FOR EXPERTS, 
COST OF COPIES OF TRANSCRIPTS OF 
TESTIMONY AT ... CRIMINAL OR CIVIL 
PROCEEDINGS, ... COST OF DEPOSITIONS 
AND COURT REPORTS OR RECORDED 
STATEMENTS AND ANY SIMILAR COSTS 
OR EPXENSES PROPERLY CHARGEABLE 
TO THE INVESTIGATION OR DEFENSE OF 
A PARTICULAR CLAIM, OR TO PROTECT 
YOUR RIGHT OF SUBROGATION. 
(Continental Policy at 10-11, 29-30.FN3) 
In ruling on this motion for summary judgment, the 
Court must, of course, draw all reasonable infer-
ences from the available evidence in the light most 
favorable to Keenan as the non-moving party. Ar-
lington v. Cobb County, 139 F.3d 865, 871 (11th 
Cir.1998). Unfortunately for Keenan, the language 
of the provision set forth above contains no ambi-
guity that could be resolved in Keenan's favor. The 
Court finds as a matter of law that Continental had 
no duty to defend Keenan under the unambiguous 
terms of the insurance contract, and Continental is 
entitled to summary judgment in its favor on that 
issue. This conclusion means that Continental has 
no liability for the $122,980 Keenan paid from its 
own funds toward legal fees and litigation costs. 
E. The Applicable Deductible 
[11] The Court has determined that Continental had 
no obligation under the Policy to provide Keenan 
with a defense in the Underlying Case, and, as ex-
cess insurer, has no obligation to indemnify Zurich 
or Travelers for any sums they expended, as 
primary insurers, in the Underlying Case. Accord-
ingly, the only expenditure remaining in dispute at 
this point is the $169,500 Keenan paid from its own 
pocket toward the settlement with Bovis. Contin-
ental argues that, because the applicable deductible 
is $250,000, it has no liability for any portion of 
that amount. Keenan argues that the deductible was 
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set at $50,000 by a subsequent endorsement for 
which it paid additional consideration. 
*11 There are two "Deductible Endorsements" in-
cluded in the Policy. The first, setting the deduct-
ible at $250,000, went into effect as of the effective 
date of the Policy, or February 1, 2000. 
(Continental Policy at 29, 30.) A later endorsement 
that went into effect on July 1, 2000 set the deduct-
ible amount at $50,000. (Continental Policy at 10, 
11.) In other words, these endorsements, considered 
together, are neither ambiguous nor inconsistent; 
instead, the question of which applies depends upon 
the effective date of a covered claim. Neither party 
addresses that question, though Continental asserts 
conclusorily that "the date of loss is prior to the 
change in deductible" (Doc. No. 124, at 8), while 
Keenan asserts, in an equally conclusory fashion, 
that Continental "was not asked to defend this case 
until well after" the $50,000 deductible endorse-
ment went into effect. (Doc. No. 113, at 24.) 
The Continental Policy, by its terms, covers 
"property damage," defined as "[p]hysical injury to 
tangible property," that "occurs during the policy 
period." (Continental Policy at 59, 47.) Clearly, the 
damage to Disney's Boardwalk Project "occurred" 
well before 2000, but the Policy contains a "known 
and continuing loss endorsement" pursuant to 
which the Policy also covers damage which first 
"manifests" during the policy term: 
All claims or suits for ... "property damage" that is 
continuous or progressively deteriorating and 
which "manifest" during this policy period will 
be deemed to apply only to this policy period and 
no other policy period. 
4Manifest(ed)" means... 
... For "property damage" when the damage is first 
discovered by the person or organization who 
suffered such damage. 
(Continental Policy at 46 (emphasis added).) 
As previously suggested, it appears that Keenan 
seeks coverage from Continental under the 2000 
Policy based on a theory that Disney, the 
"organization who suffered such damage," first dis-
covered the damage in 2000. Disney instituted the 
Underlying Case against Bovis to recover for the 
same damages as those at issue in this suit on June 
9, 2000; thus, it obviously must have "discovered" 
the subject damage of the suit at some point prior to 
that date. Keenan, in support of its argument that 
the lesser deductible applies, asserts only that Con-
tinental "was not asked to defend this case until 
well after" the $50,000 Deductible Endorsement 
went into effect. That argument has no merit, in 
part because Continental was not asked to defend 
this case until well after the 2000 Policy had ex-
pired, so the date upon which a demand for indem-
nification is made obviously cannot be deemed to 
control resolution of the question of which deduct-
ible applies. 
Moreover, under the plain language of the policy, 
Continental's liability on the contract, if any, ac-
crued when Disney discovered the Property Dam-
age, in this case no later than the date Disney filed 
suit. Since the $50,000 Deductible Endorsement, by 
its own terms, was not "effective" until July 1, 
2000, then, under a plain reading of the contract, it 
is the original $250,000 deductible which applies. 
As noted by Couch on Insurance: 
*12 It is important to consider all endorsements and 
riders before drawing any conclusions as to the 
effect of a special or general provision. The date 
the endorsement or rider was issued determines 
not only the nature of the coverage but also 
defines the period of coverage under its terms. 
For example, while an endorsement might add 
coverage of a particular type of risk, there is still 
no coverage if the loss from such a risk occurred 
before the effective date of the endorsements. 
Couch on Insurance § 22:2. 
Because the Deductible Endorsement only applies 
as of its effective date, it is logical, and necessary, 
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to construe the Policy to require application of the 
deductible that was in effect on the latest date Dis-
ney could have discovered the Property Damage. 
Simply put, because Disney had knowledge of the 
property damage prior to the July 1, 2000 effective 
date of the $50,000 Deductible Endorsement, that 
endorsement does not apply. Instead, if the losses 
are covered by the 2000 Policy at all, then the 
$250,000 deductible must govern. Keenan does not 
and could not legitimately argue that there exists 
some ambiguity in the Policy that should be con-
strued in its favor The Court cannot discern any 
contractual basis for applying the $50,000 deduct-
ible. Any liability Continental may otherwise have 
had for the $169,500 Keenan paid in indemnity is 
therefore entirely obviated by the deductible for 
which Keenan is responsible under the Policy. 
F. Application of the "Known and Continuing 
Loss" Policy Endorsement 
Another argument raised by Continental which, by 
itself, is potentially dispositive of the entire case is 
based upon the "known loss" provision in the 
Policy, referenced above, and alternatively upon a 
common-law known-loss doctrine. Because the 
Court finds that the express provision of the con-
tract is controlling, there is no need to address the 
common-law argument™ 
The "known and loss" endorsement states in relev-
ant part: 
This insurance does not apply to and we have no 
duty to defend any claim or "suit" seeking dam-
ages because of "bodily injury" or "property 
damage" that is continuous or progressively de-
teriorating and which "manifested" prior to the 
inception or after the expiration of the policy 
period; 
(Continental Policy at 46 (emphasis added).). Thus, 
the relevant question, for purposes of determining 
whether this endorsement precludes coverage, is 
when did Disney, as the "person or organization 
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who suffered such damage," become aware of prop-
erty damage that was the subject of the Underlying 
Case and is likewise the subject of Keenan's claim 
for damages against Continental. 
Continental argues that it has no liability at all for 
the damages sought by Keenan, because Disney be-
came aware of the existence of the property damage 
caused by Keenan no later than 1997, years before 
Continental contracted with Keenan to provide in-
surance coverage. Specifically, Continental points 
to two types of "property damage" caused by Keen-
an's work that were discovered by Disney prior to 
the inception of any Continental policy covering 
Keenan: (1) paint failures resulting from defective 
woodwork installed by Keenan, and (2) water intru-
sion caused by other defective work performed by 
Keenan. Keenan, in response, argues that while 
Disney knew about problems with Keenan's work 
product itself prior to 2000, there is at least a dis-
puted issue of fact as to when Disney learned of 
"property damage" covered by the Policy. 
1. Disney knew that Keenan's defective wood 
caused Lyle Painting's paint to fail prior to the 
policy period. 
*13 [12] As a preliminary matter, there appears to 
be no dispute now that Keenan's (or its subcontract-
ors') work did in fact cause "property damage" on 
Disney's project site. The record shows that Lyle 
Painting, and not Keenan, was in charge of painting 
some of the wood trim that Keenan was responsible 
for installing. The poor quality of the wood used by 
Keenan for various trim on the project caused paint 
failures for Lyle Painting, which in turn caused 
delays in the overall construction project. Because 
these paint failures occurred on an aspect of the 
construction project that was outside the scope of 
the work assigned to Keenan, they constitute 
"property damage" under the terms of the contract. 
The presence of "property damage" alone, however, 
is not sufficient to trigger the "known-loss" provi-
sions. Disney must also have "discovered" the 
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"property damage" before Continental's Policy 
went into effect on February 1, 2000. As a matter of 
contract interpretation, and contrary to Keenan's 
implicit assumption, the Continental Policy does 
not apparently require that Disney attribute the loss 
in question to Keenan or its subcontractors, or even 
that it recognize the damage in question as 
"property damage" falling within the Policy's defin-
ition of that term. Rather, the Policy itself requires 
only that Disney, as the party who suffered the 
damage, "discover" the damage within the Policy 
period. 
The evidence in the record unequivocally estab-
lishes that Disney knew of property damage to the 
painting performed by Lyle Painting caused by 
Keenan or its subcontractors no later than 1997. In 
that regard, the record contains a Memorandum 
from Charlie Hardiman of Disney cataloguing vari-
ous problems with the work at the project site, 
which specifically includes the following reference: 
"Paint defects: The sap or something is bleeding 
through due to inadequate sealing of the wood be-
fore the paint was applied. Unfortunately, the resol-
ution has been to put fresh paint over it. We need to 
fix the problem not cover it. Additionally, we are 
finding "alligatoring" of paint on numerous shut-
ters." (Doc. No. 91-11, at 2.) The record contains a 
second Memorandum from Charlie Hardiman of 
Disney dated May 22, 1997 identifying the same is-
sues (paint "alligatoring" and sap bleed). (Doc. No. 
91-18, at 1.) These problems were eventually attrib-
uted to problems with the wood installed by Keenan 
or its subcontractors rather than to problems with 
the paint job per se. Thus, the record establishes 
that Disney was aware no later than 1997 of prob-
lems with the paint that were caused by underlying 
problems with the wood for which Keenan was re-
sponsible. The question of whether Disney was ac-
tually aware that Keenan was responsible for the 
underlying problems is not material. 
2. Disney knew that Keenan's failure to ad-
equately perform its work resulted in "property 
damage" through water intrusion. 
Another instance of "property damage" caused by 
Keenan's work is documented in a 1995 letter from 
Disney to Bovis regarding water intrusion. In this 
letter, Disney explicitly stated that it was concerned 
that Keenan's "coordination" and "manpower" 
problems were delaying Bovis' completion of the 
roof and exterior facades, thereby allowing rain wa-
ter to soak into and damage several portions of the 
project site. There is no dispute that the damage at 
issue was "property damage," since Keenan, pursu-
ant to its subcontract with Bovis, was responsible 
for all "exterior wall and roof (Doc. No. 91-4, at 
11), and Keenan's alleged failure to adequately per-
form that work directly contributed to water intru-
sion in the "drywall, in-wall insulation, and wall 
finishes." (Doc. 91-9, 10/11/1995 Letter from Dis-
ney to Bovis ("In the last few months we have con-
tinuously discussed problems related to water intru-
sion in the Hotel and DVS guestroom buildings. 
The source of these problems is directly tied to 
completion of the roofs and exterior facades.").) 
Even more importantly, Disney's 1995 letter clearly 
confirms that Disney knew of this "property dam-
age" well before the Continental insurance policy 
period began in the year 2000. 
*14 Keenan argues, however, that the letter does 
not conclusively establish that Disney believed that 
Keenan was responsible for water intrusion, either 
through faulty or delayed construction. Instead, 
Keenan contends that Disney was referring to a 
separate roofing sub-contractor as being responsible 
for the water intrusion at issue. Upon further scru-
tiny, however, Keenan's attempt to favorably char-
acterize Disney's 1995 letter falls flat. Disney's let-
ter did not solely attribute the roofing delay to one 
sub-contractor. It referred to a continued lack of 
"coordination" with Bovis as the problem that all 
the sub-contractors mentioned in the letter, includ-
ing Keenan, shared in common. In addition, 
however, the letter explicitly singled out "Keenan" 
as one of the sub-contractors who could not timely 
complete the roofing due to a lack of manpower. ( 
Id.) Finally, as set forth above, Disney's 
"discovery" of the property damage under the 
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Policy exclusion does not, on its face, require that it Continental's liability under the 2000 Policy 
attribute the damage to Keenan 
There simply does not seem to be room for reason-
able minds to differ on the possible inferences 
arising from the facts presented in the record An 
derson, All U S at 248 Disney knew that the inab-
ility of Keenan and other sub contractors to co-
ordinate and muster sufficient manpower to finish 
constructing the roof and exterior facades was the 
source of the water intrusion problems, and Keenan 
has not adequately supported its assertion that a 
separate roofing sub-contractor was at fault for the 
water intrusion problem In sum, there is no materi-
al issue of disputed fact as to whether Disney 
"discovered" the property damage / e water intru-
sion, caused by Keenan's work prior to the incep-
tion of the policy 
3. The Import of Disney's Knowledge of Prop-
erty Damage Caused by Keenan's Work 
In addition to the above referenced documentation, 
the Close-Out Change Order dated August 1997 
further documents Disney's knowledge of the prob-
lems that would later give rise to the 2000 Underly-
ing Case, and m that document Disney specifically 
reserved its claims related to the above-referenced 
defects In sum, Continental has produced evidence 
documenting the requisite knowledge on the part of 
Disney, while Keenan has not pointed to any coun-
tervailing evidence in the record that would create a 
material question of fact as to whether Disney had 
discovered all of the relevant property damage prior 
to the inception of the 2000 Policy The Continental 
Policy expressly excludes coverage of property 
damage that manifested prior to the inception of the 
Policy Keenan does not contend that there are oth-
er types of covered property damage (other than the 
paint issues and water intrusion) that did not mani-
fest until sometime during the first half of 2000 (or 
later) Consequently, the Court can only presume 
that all the property damage at issue manifested pri-
or to the inception of the Policy This conclusion 
alone is sufficient to dispose of the question of 
V. CONCLUSION 
*15 As set forth above, the Court has determined 
that 
(1) The "other insurance" endorsement relieves 
Continental from any liability for amounts paid by 
Keenan's primary insurers, and limits any potential 
recovery by Keenan against Continental for monies 
that Keenan paid out of pocket to only those 
amounts which are covered by the terms of the 
Continental Policy and properly payable m indem-
nity by Continental under the "other insurance" en-
dorsement, 
(2) The "duty to defend" waiver relieves Continent-
al from any liability for those amounts spent by 
Keenan or its pnmary insurers m defending Keenan 
in the Underlying Case, and 
(3) The $250,000 Deductible Endorsement is ap-
plicable because the claims in this case, assuming 
they are covered by the 2000 Policy at all, matured 
no later than June 9, 2000, the date Disney initiated 
the Underlying Case 
Together, these three determinations lead inexor-
ably to a conclusion that Continental is entitled to 
judgment in its favor as a matter of law as to all 
damages sought by Keenan in this case The Court 
also makes an alternative finding, however, that the 
"known-loss" endorsement in the Policy relieves 
Continental from any liability for any amounts 
arising out of the "property damage" of which Dis-
ney was aware prior to 2000, before the inception 
of any policy of insurance issued by Continental to 
Keenan It appears that all the property damage at 
issue manifested prior to the Policy's inception On 
this basis as well, Continental is entitled to judg-
ment in its favor as a matter of law 
An appropriate order granting Continental's motion 
for summary judgment and dismissing this case in 
its entirety will enter 
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FNl. Keenan also argues that, in order for 
an insurer to assert a coverage defense 
based upon late notice by the insured, the 
insurer generally must meet certain re-
quirements set out in the Claims Adminis-
tration Statute, Fla. Stat. § 627.426. See 
Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Salvia, 472 So.2d 
486, 488 (Fla. 5th Dist.Ct.App.1985) 
(noting that, under the statute, certain cov-
erage defenses are barred unless the in-
surer exercises compliance with the stat-
ute). However, under Florida law, the 
Claims Administration Statute does not ap-
ply to excess insurers. Lazzara Oil Co. v. 
Columbia Gas Co., 683 F.Supp. 777, 782 
(M.D.Fla.1988). Thus, while failure to 
strictly comply with the statute will result 
in estoppel of the claim if the insurer was 
liable for coverage, it will not result in es-
toppel when liability for the claim does not 
otherwise exist. Country Manors Ass'n. v. 
Master Antenna Sys., 534 So.2d 1187 (Fla. 
4th Dist.Ct.App.1988). In this case, as dis-
cussed more fully below, the Policy unam-
biguously provides excess coverage. 
FN2. "Supplementary payments" are 
defined in the Policy as expenses incurred 
by Continental, or incurred by the insured 
at Continental's request, to assist in the in-
vestigation or defense of the claim or suit, 
costs taxed against an insured in a lawsuit, 
interest on a judgment, and other litigation-
related expenditures. (Continental Policy at 
52.) In other words, "supplementary pay-
ments" are a component of defense costs, 
and are therefore only incurred in conjunc-
tion with paying the costs of defending the 
insured against a claim or lawsuit. 
FN3. The provision negating any otherwise 
existing duty to defend is located under the 
Deductible Endorsement, and is worded 
identically in both the $50,000 Deductible 
Endorsement and the $250,000 Deductible 
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Endorsement. 
FN4. Cf. Gencor Indus., Inc. v. Wausau 
Underwriters Ins. Co., 857 F.Supp. 1560, 
1566 n. 9 (M.D.Fla.1994) (noting that it 
had no need to address the defendant's ar-
gument regarding a common law "known 
loss" doctrine in light of the court's ability 
to resolve the dispute on other grounds). 
This Court also observes that Continental 
has not referenced a single Florida case 
that actually recognizes the doctrine. In 
light of that fact, and given that insurance 
law in Florida is tightly controlled by the 
interplay between statutes and contracts, it 
seems unlikely that Florida courts would 
recognize such a common-law doctrine. 
The applicable statute, in fact, is Fla. Stat. 
§ 627.409, which lays out the circum-
stances in which a misrepresentation, 
omission or concealment of fact by an in-
sured in the course of applying or negotiat-
ing for any insurance contract may prevent 
recovery under the policy. Continental 
raises an argument under that statute in 
connection with its "known loss" defense, 
but the argument is perfunctory at best. For 
purposes of the motion for summary judg-
ment, there is clearly a question of fact as 
to whether Keenan omitted, concealed or 
misrepresented any fact it was asked or re-
quired to disclose. 
M.D.Fla.,2009. 
Keenan Hopkins Schmidt And Stowell Contractors, 
Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co. 
— F.Supp.2d — , 2009 WL 2868627 (M.D.Fla.) 
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